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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This appeal presents one simple issue.

That is,

whether a tort claimant is entitled to intervene as a matter
of right as a party defendant, in a declaratory action
initiated by an insurer against its putative insured,
wherein the insurer seeks a determination that it owes no
obligation of defense or payment to or on behalf of such
insured.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory action arising from a motorcycle
automobile accident which occurred in July, 19 84, between

Defendant and Intervenor.

This appeal concerns the right of

Intervenor to intervene as a party defendant in the
proceeding where Plaintiff insurer seeks a determination
that it owes no obligation of defense or payment to or on
behalf of Defendant arising from such accident.
This action was initiated in April, 1985.

Defendant

appeared pro se and Intervenor filed a Motion to Intervene
as a Defendant, which Motion was denied by Order of the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

Intervenor's Notice of Appeal

was filed herein on August 1, 1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is little dispute concerning the facts in this
proceeding.

On or about July 11, 19 84, Intervenor was

injured in a collision in Salt Lake City, Utah between his
motorcycle and an automobile driven by Defendant. (R.3, 15,
16, 24). At that time, Defendant was residing with her
father, Melvin S. Larsen, with whom Plaintiff was an insurer
pursuant to an insurance policy. (R.3).

The vehicle driven

by Defendant was owned by one Paul Lawrence, who maintained
a policy of insurance with Prudential Insurance Company with
policy limits of $50,000.00. (R.3, 36, 42). In connection
with the collision, Defendant was cited for improper
lookout.

Intervenor received no citation. (R.16).

As a result of the collision, Intervenor was
hospitalized for approximately seven weeJcs and underwent
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seven operations culminating in the amputation of his right
leg approximately five inches below the knee. (R.16).
Intervenor has incurred medical expenses of $60,000.00, been
disabled since the collision and has incurred substantial
general damages. (R.16).
On April 25, 1985, Plaintiff filed its complaint
seeking a determination that it owed no obligation of
defense or payment to or on behalf of Defendant in
connection with the accident.

(R.2).

On May 28, 1985,

Defendant filed a pro se Answer wherein she admitted that
Plaintiff did not owe any obligation of defense or payment
and that she expected no coverage from the subject insurance
policy.

(R.24, 25).

On May 28, 1985, Intervenor filed his Motion to
Intervene as a Defendant and a proposed Answer pursuant to
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds
that the representation of Intervener's interests by
Defendant was inadequate and that Intervenor would be bound
by a judgment therein.

(R.22).

The proposed Answer

asserted, inter alia, that the subject policy of insurance
provided coverage for the collision between Defendant and
Intervenor on the basis that Defendant's vehicle was a
non-owned vehicle driven by the named insured's relative,
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Melvin S. Larsen, and that Plaintiff had in bad faith
initiated the proceeding. (R.6, 16, 17, 18, 30, 31).
Intervener's Motion was denied by Order dated July 2,
1985.

(R.53, 54). This Appeal was then filed on August 1,

1985.

(R.55) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

establishes four requirements which must be met to allow a
non-party to intervene in a proceeding as a matter of right.
These requirements are:
1.

A timely application to intervene,

2.

An interest in the subject matter of the dispute,

3.

Inadequate representation or possible inadequate

representation of its interests, and
4.

A judgment in the action will or may bind the

appli cant.
Intervenor herein satisfies these requirements as
discussed in depth by the Court in Lima v. Chambers, 65 7
P.2d 279 (Utah 1982) and the denial of his Motion to
Intervene as a party defendant herein was erroneous.
ARGUMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, A TORT CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENTION OF
RIGHT AS A PARTY DEFENDANT IN A DECLARATORY ACTION INITIATED
BY AN INSURER AGAINST ITS INSURED.
Intervention of right is governed by Rule 24(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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That rule reads as follows:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property which is in the custody or subject to the
control or disposition of the court or an officer
thereof.
Intervention as a party defendant herein is sought
pursuant to paragraph (2) of Rule 24(a).

By the terms of

that rule, four requirements must be met to establish
intervention of right:
1.

A timely application to intervene,

2.

An interest in the subject matter of the dispute,

3.

Inadequate representation or possible inadequate

representation of its interests, and
4.

A judgment in the action will or may bind the

applicant.
These requirements were recently discussed in depth by
this Court in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P2d 279 (19 82),

That

case involved a motion to intervene by the automobile
liability insurance carrier in the tort action between its
insured and an uninsured motorist tortfeasor.
It has not been disputed that the first requirement,
timeliness, was met by Intervenor.

The Motion to Intervene,

supported by a proposed Answer, was filed on May 28, 1985,
the same day that Defendant filed her pro se Answer and
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twenty days after the service of the Summons and Complaint
upon her.

Thus, Intervenor sought to become a party to the

litigation at its earliest stage and in a timely manner.•
The second requirement is that the Intervenor has an
interest in the subject matter of the dispute.

In Lima,

this Court interpreted this requirement to mean that the
Intervenor must stand to either gain or lose by the
operation of the judgment to be rendered.
It is clear that Intervenor stands to lose by the
operation of a judgment which establishes that Insurer has
no obligation of payment on behalf of Defendant for injuries
caused to Intervenor by her negligence.

Due to the fact

that a judgment herein in favor of the Insurer will leave
Defendant with insurance coverage through another carrier
with policy limits of only $50,000.00, Intervenor will be
deprived of the opportunity to recover the full amount of
his damages arising from Defendant's negligence, which
damages consist of the loss of his leg, in excess of
$60,000.00 in medical expenses, disability since July 11,
1984 and his substantial general damages.

This deprivation

establishes that Intervenor stands to lose by the operation
of a judgment therein and has a sufficient interest in the
subject matter of the action to meet the second requirement.
The third requirement is that the Intervener's interest
will or may be inadequately represented by the existing
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defendant.

In Limaf this Court discussed this requirement

as consisting of two components.

First, whether there is an

identity or a divergence of interest between the Intervenor
and the original party and second, whether that interest is
diligently represented.
In the instant proceeding, as in Lima, Intervener's
interest is different from that of Defendant and as a
result, not represented.

This divergence is represented by

Defendant's Answer which admits that Insurer owes no
obligation of defense or payment.

Defendant's interest

appears to be in minimizing her costs in defending this
proceeding rather than in a determination of whether Insurer
owes an obligation to Defendant pursuant to the terms of the
policy.
Furthermore, Defendant is not represented by counsel,
which fact this Court indicated in Lima created a strong
presumption against adequate representation.

Defendant's

pro se Answer contains admissions, which may not have any
legal or factual basis, upon which Insurer would obtain a
judgment in its favor.

Thus, Intervenor satisfies the third

requirement.
The final requirement is that the Intervenor is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action.

In Lima, this Court

discussed the conflict of authority which exists concerning
the meaning of the word "bound."
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In so doing, this Court

rejected the strict interpretation of those authorities
which requires a showing that the judgment would be res
judicata to the Intervenor and instead adopted the majority
rule of a more liberal construction requiring only a showing
that the Intervenor would be bound in a practical sense in
that his interest is impaired in some way by the judgment.
As a practical matter, Intervenor would be "bound" by a
judgment in favor of Insurer establishing that no coverage
exists pursuant to its policy and his interest would be
impaired in that he would be left without an avenue to
obtain a full recovery for his injuries incurred in the
underlying automobile accident.

Accordingly, the fourth

requirement for intervention is met.
It is admitted that the factual background of Lima is
substantially different from that of this proceeding.

While

Linia involved intervention by the contractual insurer in
tne tort action between its insured and an uninsured
motorist tortfeasor, the instant action involves
intervention by the tort claimant in the contractual action
between the insurer and its insured tortfeasor.

It is not

logical, however, to allow intervention in the former
situation, but not in the latter.
No authority is found in this jurisdiction either
allowing or denying intervention to a tort claimant in the
contractual action between the insurer and its insured.
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In

fact, there is a scarcity of cases from other jurisdictions
on this issue.

Authority for the allowance of such

intervention does, however, exist.

See Miller v. Market

Men's Mutual Insurance Company, 115 N.W. 2d 266 (Minn.
1962).

In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed

the tort claimant to intervene in the third-party action
between the tortfeasor and its insurer for declaratory
relief to determine the coverage afforded by the insurance
policy, stating:
It is our opinion that where the issue of contract
liability between an insurer and an insured in an
action of this kind is separated for trial from the
main action, no prejudice can result to anyone if the
injured party is permitted to intervene in that action.
In denying intervention in this proceeding, the lower
Court apparently relied on Utah Farm Bureau v. Chugg, 315
P.2d 277 (Utah 1957).

That reliance is misplaced as that

case is clearly distinguishable from this proceeding.

In

Chugg, the tort claimant initiated an action for damages
against the insured tortfeasor.

The insurer then filed a

declaratory action against its insured seeking to determine
its rights under the insurance policy and joined the tort
claimant as a party defendant.

Thus, Chugg involved

permissive joinder under Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than Rule 24 intervention of right which
is at issue herein.
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In stating that the tort claimant's joinder could not
be compelled under those circumstances, this Court expressed
the concern that to allow otherwise would permit the insurer
to delay the tort action for the purpose of determining in
advance whether it should defend its insured in that action
and would drag the tort claimant into an action in which he
did not desire to be a party, stating:
An injured party should have the right, if he desires,
to have his action tried with dispatch and without
regard to any dispute between the person who injured
him and the latterfs insurer or insurers.
The joinder involved in Chugg is clearly different
than the intervention that is sought herein.

Intervenor is

not seeking to join his negligence claim against Defendant
to Insurer's claim to construe the provisions of the
insurance contract nor is he attempting to join Insurer as a
party in the separate negligence action that he has
commenced against Defendant.

Intervenor is not seeking to

interpose any issues which do not presently exist in this
proceeding.

He is merely attempting to intervene to see

that his interests are adequately represented in the action
declaring the terms of the insurance contract.

This limited

purpose is evidenced by the proposed Answer filed by
Intervenor, which merely seeks to construe the terms of the
insurance policy.
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This Court further stated in Chugg at 406 as follows:
Indeed, if such tort victim is a proper party to the
present action,then it would appear that the insurance
company, and other companies similarly situated, is a
proper party to a tort action against the insured - a
proposition which, it is safe to assume, such companies
would not espouse.
Since such a proposition has since been espoused
insurance companies and has been endorsed by this Court in
Lima, the time has come when intervention as a matter of
right should be granted to a tort claimant in declaratory
action between an insurer and its insured.
CONCLUSION
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
clearly designed to allow a procedure by which a non-party
having a substantial interest m

the litigation and whose

interest will not be adequately protected by the litigants
to intervene.

To allow intervention as a party defendant in

this proceeding will insure that the Insurer's claim of
non-coverage is fully and fairly litigated.
Any adverse effect on the present parties resulting
from intervention is outweighed by the substantial prejudice
to Intervenor if his application to intervene is denied.
Having met the four requirements for intervention of right
Intervenor should be allowed to intervene as a party
defendant in the action between the insurer and its putative
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insured.

Accordingly,

t h e lower C o u r t ' s Order d e n y i n g

Motion t o I n t e r v e n e i s e r r o n e o u s

and t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d be

remanded w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n t h a t I n t e r v e n o r
party defendant

the

be named a s a

and be a l l o w e d t o f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t e

in

the

litigation.
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